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positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership. 
Additionally, we observe a negative correlation between bargained wages in aggregate and 
average risk preferences of union members. Our results suggest that an overall increase in risk 
aversion contributes to wage moderation and promotes employment. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade unions provide public goods, such as wages above the market-clearing level or 
improvements in working conditions. The basis for achieving such outcomes is a powerful 
bargaining position. In the context of collective negotiations, union strength is often viewed as 
being determined by the size of its membership. However, an individual will only join a trade 
union if this makes him better off. Therefore, in the absence of a closed-shop and given the 
public good characteristic of many union-provided goods, trade unions also have to supply 
excludable goods solely to its members to entice workers to join. When deciding whether to 
become a trade union member, a worker will compare the costs—such as the membership fee—
with the gain, for example, from the consumption of the excludable good provided by the trade 
union. The evaluation of costs and gain depends on individual preferences and is likely to vary 
with risk attitudes. However, the link between individual risk preferences and union 
membership is largely unexplored. This is challenging as individual membership decisions lead 
to variations of union density and bargaining power. In addition, such decisions might directly 
influence union preferences. Accordingly, knowledge of the relationship between risk attitudes 
and union membership can help to ascertain how collective negotiations are influenced by 
changes in the distribution of individual risk preferences. Such changes can, for example, result 
from a composition effect due to an increase in the shares of older or of female workers who are 
found to be more risk averse than their younger or male counterparts (e.g. Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner 2005, Sahm 2007).  
The analysis in this paper is based on an open-shop union model in the tradition of Booth 
(1985) and Booth and Chatterji (1995). We assume that a worker's willingness to pay for the 
private good which union membership entails varies with risk preferences. This establishes a 
relationship, albeit an ambiguous one, between risk aversion and the net gain from union 
membership. In the literature on open-shop models—surveyed, for example, by Schnabel 
(2003)—few papers have explicitly incorporated notions of risk aversion. These contributions 
assume workers to be heterogeneous with respect to the valuation of a union-provided good but 
do not allow for variations in individual risk attitudes, as is the case in our investigation. We 
also analyse the effect of risk aversion on bargained wages which is, again, theoretically 
indeterminate. The link between an individual's level of risk aversion and union membership 
status and the implications for collective bargaining outcomes are, hence, largely empirical 
issues. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey, containing a novel set of direct measures of individual risk 
attitudes, we empirically explore the impact of risk attitudes on union membership. To the best 
of our knowledge, no such investigation has been undertaken to date. We find that a worker is   2
more inclined to be a trade union member the more risk-averse he is. In addition, we analyse 
the correlation between aggregated wages and average risk preferences of union members. Our 
results suggest that an overall increase in risk aversion contributes to wage moderation and 
promotes employment.  
In summary, this paper makes three contributions: First, it provides a theoretical analysis of the 
impact of a worker's risk attitude on the propensity to join a union, and the consequences for 
collective bargaining outcomes. Second, it offers an explicit empirical test of the membership 
effect of individual risk preferences. Third, it provides evidence on the wage effects of changes 
in risk preferences of union members. The paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 sets out the 
model of endogenous union membership. The analysis features one open-shop trade union and 
one firm. Section 3 contains the description of the data and our empirical specification. In 
Sections 4 and 5 we present the empirical results, while Section 6 summarises our findings. 
 
2. Risk Aversion, Endogenous Union Membership, and Wage Bargaining 
To investigate the relation between risk aversion and trade union membership we focus on the 
employment risk, because excessive wage claims are essential ingredients of trade union 
models. The framework is based on the German institutional setting in which there is no 
differential treatment of workers according to union membership status. Thus, a union wage 
premium or a lower dismissal probability cannot help to overcome the free-riding problem. 
Accordingly, the individual employment status is independent of union membership. The risk 
attitude then describes how an individual evaluates the income variation in different 
employment situations. Since our empirical proxies for risk mainly refer to variations in 
monetary payoffs, the theoretical approach provides a close match to the empirical application.
  
A number of previous contributions have related risk attitudes, union membership and 
collective bargaining outcomes by way of an insurance motive. In particular, trade unions have 
been assumed to insure their members against income variations (Agell and Lommerud 1992, 
Burda 1995) or to lower the probability of an arbitrary dismissal (Blanchflower, Crouchley, 
Estrin and Oswald 1990 and Moreton 1998, 1999). However, in open-shop settings, in which 
the membership decision is endogenous, a reduction in income variability represents a public 
good and provides no incentive for an individual to voluntarily join a trade union. Additionally, 
the assumption of offering insurance against arbitrary dismissal is not consistent with the 
institutional set-up in Germany from where our data stem. 
 Membership Decision 
To generate an incentive to join the trade union, it is assumed that the union provides a private 
(i.e. excludable) good which each member consumes with certainty. This good may consist of 
legal advice, provision of insurance- or pension-plans at lower prices than available elsewhere, 
or of job-related information. Alternatively, members may conform to a social norm of being a 
trade union member. The nature of the private good is irrelevant for the analysis and will, 
hence, not be specified in detail. Let total utility be additively separable in the utility from 
income and from the private good. The utility from income is given by w(1 – σi)/(1 – σi) for 0 < 
σi ≠ 1 and by ln(w) for σi = 1, where w represents the wage and σi worker i's constant Arrow-
Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. Our subsequent exposition focuses on the case of σi ≠ 1. 
The measure of relative risk aversion is distributed on the interval [σmin + ε; σmax + ε], ε ≥  0. 
Increasing ε from ε = 0 mimics a general rise in risk aversion. The effects of such a rise will be 
explored later on. The utility from consuming the private union good can differ for employed 
and unemployed workers and is denoted by Ce and Cu, respectively, Ce, Cu > 0. Theoretically, 
no restriction on the relative magnitude of Ce and Cu is feasible.  
Given a membership fee Gw, 0 < G < 1, disposable income of an employed worker amounts to 
w ~  := w(1 – G).
1 An unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits b. If he is a union 
member he will pay a membership fee as well and his disposable income will equal 0 < b
~
 < b 
<  w ~ . An employed non-member also receives the wage w. The probability that a worker is 
employed equals N(w), assuming a random draw from the population of all workers, the size of 
which is normalised to unity. Hence, 0 < N(w) ≤  1 also describes the employment level.  
Worker i decides about membership, anticipating the (equilibrium) levels of union density and 
wages. The worker will join the union if the gain Z(σi) from doing so is positive. To ensure the 
existence of the trade union, there is at least one worker i for whom Z(σi) > 0 holds. Since the 
utility from the private union good is assumed to be independent of risk attitudes for analytical 
simplicity, while the evaluation of incomes differs across workers, risk attitudes only affect the 
costs of union membership. As one consequence there is a measure of risk aversion denoted by 
σ which makes a particular worker indifferent to leaving the trade union or to remaining in it. It 
is defined by Z(σ, …) = 0. 
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1 This assumption is in line with the situation in Germany, where membership fees amount to 1% of the gross wage 
for employed workers. The subsequent results extend to a fee which is an increasing and weakly convex function 
G(w) of the wage w, 0 < G(w) < w, 1 > G' > 0, G'' ≥  0. 0
1
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The worker implicitly defined by equation (1) represents the marginal member. The derivatives 
of Z(σ,…) with respect to wages (Zw) and the marginal member's measure of relative risk 
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The consequences of higher wages on the (marginal member's) gain from trade union 
membership are ambiguous because the wage affects the employment probability N(w) and the 
payoff when having a job. Empirically, a worker's wage has not been found to alter the 
probability of union membership in Germany (see the estimates presented below and Wagner 
1991, Fitzenberger, Ernst and Haggeney 1999, and Goerke and Pannenberg 2004). This implies 
Zw = 0. The further theoretical analysis will make use of this finding to simplify the exposition. 
The gain from membership varies also with the measure of relative risk aversion σ in an 
ambiguous manner because the utility differential from membership in both employment states 
is altered differently. This ambiguity arises despite the fact that the utility Ce (or Cu) from 
consuming the private union good is certain, additive, and not subject to an employee's risk 
attitude.
2 More general assumptions on the nature of this good thus cannot clarify the 
relationship between union membership and risk aversion from a theoretical point of view. If 
the gain from membership rises with risk aversion, implying Zσ > 0, all workers characterised 
by σi > σ will benefit from membership so that the worker with the highest measure of relative 
risk aversion will be the first to join the union. 
To relate our analysis to earlier contributions, note that the membership decision is independent 
of risk attitudes for a given wage in Booth's (1984) seminal paper. This is because an employed 
worker's gain from membership Ce is also subject to risk aversion, and a non-member is 
unemployed with certainty. In Moreton's (1998, 1999) set-up, a variation in risk aversion is 
modelled as a change in the second derivative of the utility function, holding constant the first 
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2 If also the utility from consuming the private good were subject to risk aversion and, for example, the utility of an 
employed union member given by (w ~ + Ce)(1 – σ)/(1 – σ), the sign of Zσ would still be ambiguous and depend on 
the magnitude of σ. derivative. Since the membership decision only depends on utility levels, it is unaffected by risk 
attitudes. Finally, Oswald (1982) presumes that the income of a union member is higher than 
that of a non-member who is employed with certainty. In this case, the benefits from forming 
and joining a union decline with the measure of relative risk aversion.  
Wage Bargaining 
The outcome of the wage bargain is determined by the (symmetric) Nash solution. The union's 
preferences are given by those of the median member, whose Arrow-Pratt measure of relative 
risk aversion is denoted by μ. The median member is employed with probability N(w) and in 
this case obtains   as payoff, while he is unemployed with probability   
(1 – N(w)) and then receives 
e C ) 1 /( 1 w ~ + μ − μ −
u C ) 1 /( 1 b
~
+ μ − μ − . The trade union's fallback payoff is defined 
by an unemployed worker's utility, so that the gain from bargaining amounts to N(w)Ω, 
u C e C ) 1 /( ) 1 b
~ 1 w ~ ( : − + μ − μ − − μ − = Ω . The firm uses labour as the only input, while the 
output price is normalised to unity. Profit maximization leads to ∂Π/∂N = 0, ∂Π/∂w = -N(w) by 
the envelope theorem, and ∂N/∂w := N'(w) < 0. The fallback payoff of the firm is zero. The 
wage is consequently defined by: 
0 ) w ( ' N
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Subsequently, an interior solution is assumed, implying Vw < 0, which yields a wage above the 
full employment level, so that 0 < N(w) < 1. The wage effect of an increase in the measure μ of 
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The sign of Vμ is shaped by two effects: A greater relative risk aversion lowers the gain w ~ -μ 
from a higher wage in equation (4). Additionally, a rise in μ alters the median member's gain 
N(w)Ω from bargaining. The overall impact is negative for w ~  ≥  b
~
 and Ce > Cu. However, an 
unemployed worker's gain from consuming the private good may exceed or fall short of the 
gain for his employed counterpart, so that the signs of Ce – Cu and of Vμ are indeterminate.  
Relating our findings to those of previous contributions, negative wage and positive 
employment effects of higher risk aversion have been derived in (closed-shop) collective 
bargaining models, for example, by Sampson (1983), McDonald (1991), Oswald (1982), and 
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Blair and Crawford (1984). The employment result extends to a setting in which the alternative 
income is endogenised (see Nickell 1990).  
Comparative Statics 
We start our comparative statics exercise by looking at the impact of a rise in the measure of 
relative risk aversion of all workers on the incentives to join a trade union. Subsequently, we 
investigate the consequences for wages. Because a change in the wage does not alter the 
probability of membership (that is, since Zw = 0), the membership curve is vertical in the 
wage–risk aversion space. This implies that the marginal trade union member—and, hence, 
union density—are uniquely defined by Z(σ,…) = 0. In particular, if the interval [σmin + ε; 
σmax + ε], ε ≥  0, from which the measure of risk aversion stems, shifts to the right because ε 
rises from zero to ε > 0 as depicted in Figure 1, the new marginal member will be characterised 
by the same value of relative risk aversion as the original one (∂σ/∂ε = 0).
3 However, the level 
of risk aversion of the marginal member will be closer to the lower bound of the interval. For 
Zσ > 0, this effect is equivalent to an increase in the number of union members. The result can 
be summarised as: 
Proposition 1:    
For Zw = 0 and Zσ > 0, a general rise in the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion 
raises trade union density. 
 
3 Our subsequent results will also hold if all workers in the neighbourhood of the marginal and the median member 









Having established the relationship between individual risk aversion and the incentives to 
become a union member, we now turn to the link between collective bargaining outcomes and 
risk aversion. Given Vw < 0 and even assuming Vμ < 0, the wage effects of a rise in risk 
aversion cannot be ascertained because the impact on the median member's measure of risk 
aversion  μ is uncertain. The measure μ is likely to increase with a general shift of the 
distribution to the right (implying ∂μ/∂ε > 0), because everyone—including the median 
member—becomes more risk-averse. Theoretically, however, a fall in μ cannot be ruled out 
(that is, ∂μ/∂ε < 0). This is the case since the identity of the median changes. If a relatively large 
mass of the distribution of the measure of risk aversion lay to the left of the original marginal 
member but to the right of σ subsequent to the shift of the distribution, the median member's 
risk aversion might decline. This effect will not occur if the distribution is fairly symmetric 
around the positions of the original and new marginal member. Assuming, therefore, for 
analytical simplicity a uniform distribution, the median member's measure of relative risk 
aversion equals μ = [σ + (σmax + ε)]/2. Accordingly, a general increase in risk aversion also 
raises μ (∂μ/∂ε = 0.5). In this case, the wage-bargaining curve V is unambiguously downward-
sloping in the wage–risk aversion space, as depicted in Figure 1. Moreover, a general rise in 
n σ max σ ε + σmax ε + σmi σ n  8
                                                
risk aversion shifts the curve downward from V0 to V1. The wage effect is given by dw/dε = - 
Vμ/(2Vw). The employment consequences are determined by the wage change. We may then 
summarise: 
Proposition 2:    
Assume Vμ < 0, that is, a negative relationship between the median member's measure of risk 
aversion and the bargained wage. If, in addition, Zw = 0 holds and the Arrow–Pratt measure of 
relative risk aversion is distributed uniformly, a general rise in the measure of relative risk 
aversion will lower the bargained wage and raise employment. 
Given the theoretical ambiguities underlying the Propositions, the relationships between risk 
aversion and (1) the individual incentives to become a trade union member and (2) collective 
bargaining outcomes ultimately become empirical issues. The multiplicity of possible effects 
indicates, in addition, that (1) a more sophisticated, that is non-linear, specification of the utility 
function, that (2) a more detailed treatment of the behaviour of unemployed or that (3) a more 
elaborate specification of the risk that workers face will not yield more precise predictions.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Specifications 
Data 
In our theoretical model, wages result from negotiations between a trade union and employer. 
To capture this setting, matched employer–employee data with detailed information on firms 
and workers are desirable. However, the available linked employer–employee data sets for 
Germany provide no information on individual risk attitudes, which is pivotal for our analysis. 
Therefore, we utilise data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey of the resident German population (Wagner, Burkhauser, and 
Behringer 1993, Wagner, Frick and Schupp 2007), containing a number of direct measures of 
individual risk attitudes, three of which we use. The 2003 survey included information on union 
membership, while the 2004 survey contained the risk indicators.
4 Our sample consists of full-
time workers from West and East Germany with valid information on the relevant risk 
measures and union membership. Self-employed, apprentices and civil servants ('Beamte') are 
excluded. Using NACE one-digit industry classifications, union density in our sample ranges 
from 8% in the financial sector to 66% in ‘mining and quarrying’, with an average of 18.4%.  
 
4 The data used was extracted using the add-on package Panelwhiz v1.0 written by J. P. Haisken-DeNew (Haisken-
DeNew, Hahn 2006; http://www.panelwhiz.eu) and plug-ins written by J. P. Haisken-DeNew and M. Hahn.   9
As argued above, the individual decision to join a trade union depends on income levels, the 
probability of employment, the utility of the private good provided by the trade union and the 
membership fee. Hence, information on how individual risk attitudes affect the evaluation of 
monetary payments is required. To meet this requirement we first utilise a survey question 
requiring respondents to indicate their willingness to take risks in financial matters. The exact 
wording of the question is: "People can behave differently in different situations. How would 
you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters? Please tick a box on the scale where 
the value 0 means "totally unwilling to take risk" and the value 10 means "fully prepared to take 
risks" (own translation). Second, we employ a survey question corresponding more closely to 
one of the standard lottery measures used in experiments. In particular, information is collected 
on an individual's investment choices, based on a hypothetical lottery prize of €100,000. The 
respondent can invest the prize and purchase a risky asset for €100,000, €80,000, €60,000, 
€40,000, or €20,000 or can refrain from such an acquisition, with equal chances of doubling the 
amount invested or losing half of it after two years. Since the second measure is based on 
explicit stakes and probabilities, it holds risk perceptions constant across individuals. As a 
check of robustness, we additionally employ a survey question on the willingness to take risks 
in general, where again the eleven-point scale is used.  
One might argue that respondents interpret the eleven-point scale of our risk questions 
differently. To minimize potential problems resulting from individual-specific interpretations of 
the scales we additionally employ a binary risk indicator variable for whether someone chooses 
a value of 5 or lower on the scale as a check of robustness. We interpret this dummy variable as 
an indicator that someone is “relatively unwilling to take risks” compared to a worker 
“relatively willing to take risk”.  
The GSOEP risk measures have been validated in several experiments. Dohmen et al. (2005) 
find that questionnaire responses to the general risk question are reliable predictors of actual 
risk-taking behaviour in a field experiment with representative subject pools. Moreover, 
answers to the general risk question are strongly correlated with answers to the other two 
questions. In addition, Dohmen et al. (2005) demonstrate that the best predictor of a specific 
outcome is the risk measure most closely associated to the relevant context. Therefore, we are 
confident that the GSOEP risk measures are high-quality proxies for actual risk preferences in 
our specific context.  
Due to data availability we link the information on individual risk attitudes in 2004 with data on 
union membership and its determinants measured in 2003. Hence, the crucial assumption of our 
empirical work is that individual union membership in 2003 does not alter peoples' risk 
attitudes until 2004. This requirement is consistent with evidence provided by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), Sahm (2007), and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008) 
that risk preferences elicited from hypothetical lotteries in surveys are stable over time.  
Empirical Specifications 
Since we want to assess the effect of individual risk attitudes on trade union membership, that is 
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where  =1 if the individual is a union member (in 2003),  ,03 i U ,04 i R is the relevant measure of 
individual risk attitudes (in 2004),  ,03 i X  is a vector of control variables (also measured in 2003), 
α , 
' β are (vectors) of unknown parameters and  () Φ  is the cdf of the standard normal 
distribution. Estimated marginal effects and standard errors robust with respect to clustering at 
the household level are documented.  
As a first check of robustness, we address the potential endogeneity of our plain risk measures 
and employ an instrumental variable probit estimator (Wooldridge 2002, 472-477). Individual 
height is used as an instrument for individual risk attitudes, since height (i) is plausibly 
exogenous to the indicators of individual risk attitudes and has a significant impact on 
individual risk preferences, (ii) is not correlated with the error term in the union membership 
equation, and (iii) has no direct impact on the likelihood of being a union member.  
Both probit estimators require a distributional assumption to be made, i.e., a particular 
normality assumption. However, there is no prior knowledge on the validity of this assumption. 
As a second check of robustness, we therefore employ a semi-nonparametric estimator 
originally suggested by Gallant and Nychka (1987) and used in applied work, for example, by 
Gabler, Laisney and Lechner (1993) and Stewart (2005). Essentially, this estimator 
approximates the true distribution of the error terms by a Hermite series. The approximation 
can be expressed as the product of the normal density and a squared polynomial and thus nests 
the standard probit model of equation (6). It can be estimated by maximizing a pseudo-
likelihood function and usual test procedures can be applied. We adopt the framework proposed 
by Stewart (2004) to test the validity of the distributional assumption of the probit model in our 
application and to estimate the parameters of interest.  
The vector of control variables consists of the usual covariates that previous studies have found 
to affect the probability of union membership in Germany: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, and dummy variables for being a foreigner, being male, different firm size categories, 
having completed an apprenticeship, having a university degree, being a member of a works 
council, having preferences for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the Christian Democratic   11
                                                
Parties (CDU/CSU), the father being self-employed when the respondent was 15 years old, 
being a blue collar worker, the industry (NACE 1-digit) in which the respondent works, and the 
state of residence ('Bundesland').
5 Since we link data from the years 2003 and 2004, 
longitudinal sample weights are calculated and used to account for the design of the different 




Figure 2 shows the distribution of individual risk attitudes in financial matters by union 
membership status. Each bar in the histograms indicates the percentage of respondents choosing 
a number on the eleven-point scale, indicating their willingness to take risks in financial 
matters. The according reluctance is striking: 86% of non-members and 91% of union members 
choose a value of five or less on the eleven-point scale. Moreover, Figure 2 reveals that union 
members are more risk-averse than non-unionists. Figure 3 corroborates this impression with 
respect to the lottery measure: 64% of union members and 54% of non-members do not invest a 
positive amount of the hypothetical lottery prize in the risky asset.
6 With respect to general risk 
attitudes, Figure A1 (in the Appendix) documents that 63% of all workers choose a value of 
five or less on the eleven-point scale. However, for this measure we do not observe significant 




The descriptive evidence indicates that risk aversion is more prevalent among union members. 
We therefore use the standard weighted probit specification to assess whether individual risk 
attitudes have an impact on union membership. For the sake of a more intuitive interpretation 
we recoded the eleven-point scale of the two risk measures for our regression analysis in 
reverse order, i.e., '0' indicating strong risk-love and '10' total reluctance to take risks. 
Consequently, for all measures of risk a higher value indicates greater risk-aversion.
7  
 
5 Descriptive statistics for all control variables are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
6 Kolmogoroff/Smirnov tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions of risk attitudes for union 
members and non-members at the α = 0.002 (α = 0.061) level for the financial risk (lottery) question. 
7 With respect to the lottery measure, we do not have to recode our variable, since ‘1’ indicates an investment of 
€100,000 and ‘6’ indicates an investment of €0.  Figure 2: 
 
0: non-member;         1: member of a trade union 
 
Figure 3:  
 
0: non-member;         1: member of a trade union 
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As a preliminary exercise, we estimated regressions also including the log of the monthly gross 
wage as covariate. Irrespective of the measure of individual risk aversion employed, we were 
able to replicate previous findings by Wagner (1991), Fitzenberger et al. (1999), and Goerke 
and Pannenberg (2004) that the individual gross wage does not influence the probability of 
membership.
8 Accordingly, the wage is not included in our main specifications. In terms of our 
theoretical model, the assumption Zw = 0 captures the insignificant wage effect.  
Table 1 presents the estimated marginal effects and their standard errors for the three measures 
of individual risk attitudes. Since our focus is on the relationship between risk aversion and 
union membership we do not discuss the parameter estimates for the set of control variables. 
They are in line with results from other studies.
9 Column 1 reveals that full-time workers who 
are more risk-averse in financial affairs exhibit a significantly higher probability of being a 
union member than their less risk-averse colleagues. The marginal effects imply that someone 
who switches from being extremely risk-loving ('0') to being extremely risk-averse ('10', after 
recoding) in financial matters exhibits a roughly seven-percentage-point higher likelihood of 
being a union member. The size of the estimated marginal effect is remarkable, since the 
unconditional mean of being a union member is slightly above 18% in our sample. Column 2 
presents the estimates for the lottery measure of individual risk aversion. We observe a 
significant increase of similar magnitude in the probability of being a union member if someone 
decides not to invest a positive fraction of the hypothetical prize in the risky asset. If we use the 
more encompassing measure of individual risk attitudes, we do not find a significant effect 
(column 4). This is in line with evidence by Dohmen et al. (2005) that a context-specific 
measure of individual risk attitudes is the best predictor of actual behaviour in that context.  
 
 
8 Table A1 in the Appendix documents the parameter estimates for a specification with the measure of individual 
risk attitudes in financial matters. 
9 See, for example, Fitzenberger et al. (1999), Fitzenberger et al. (2006), Goerke and Pannenberg (2004), and 
Schnabel and Wagner (2003). Only the significantly positive effect works council membership has not generally 
been established yet. See Goerke and Pannenberg (2007) for further evidence on this relationship.    14
Table 1: Union Membership and Individual Risk Attitudes in Germany 
      -   Probit Estimates - 
  ME / s.e. ME / s.e. ME / s.e. 
Risk Aversion_finance  0.007* --  -- 
  (0.003) --  -- 
Risk Aversion_lottery  -- 0.013*  -- 
  -- (0.006)  -- 
Risk Aversion_general  -- --  -0.003 
  -- --  (0.003) 
Blue_collar  0.124** 0.125** 0.129** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Father_self-employed  -0.051* -0.057* -0.054* 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Prefers SPD  0.105** 0.103** 0.101** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Prefers CDU/CSU  -0.046** -0.047** -0.050** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Member of works council  0.364** 0.360** 0.359** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Tenure  0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tenure (sqrd)  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Apprenticeship  0.017 0.017 0.016 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
University degree  -0.042 -0.041 -0.044 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm size: 20 ≤ X < 200 workers  0.095** 0.094** 0.094** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Firm size: 200 ≤ X < 2000 workers  0.189** 0.185** 0.186** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm size: X ≥  2000 workers  0.256** 0.253** 0.251** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Male  0.029 0.027 0.020 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Foreigner  0.016 0.016 0.020 





  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age (sqrd)  -0.000
+  -0.000  -0.000
+ 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummies & state 
dummies 
yes yes yes 
Wald_X   547.2** 547.0** 551.5** 
N  5369 5370 5372 
         Source:  SOEP 2003-2004. Longitudinal weights are used.   
         ME/s.e.: marginal effect/standard error. Robust standard errors also allow for  
         clustering at the household level.  
         Wald_X: Wald test with H0: no joint significance of all regressors. (df=45) 
                    Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10).   15
                                                
In sum, we observe a significantly positive association between individual risk aversion in 
monetary affairs and the likelihood of being a union member. Hence, in terms of the theoretical 
discussion in Section 2, an overall increase in risk aversion is accompanied by an increase in 
union density, a finding which is consistent with a positive impact of the measure of risk 
aversion on the gain from trade union membership, i. e. with Zσ > 0 and Proposition 1. 
Checks of Robustness 
The previous empirical specifications have assumed that the measures of individual risk 
attitudes are not correlated with the errors in the membership equation. However, one might 
argue that individual risk attitudes are endogenous. We test for the potential endogeneity of 
individual risk attitudes by means of the IV probit estimator, using the instrument ‘individual 
height’, as described above.
10 Wald tests, however, indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the relevant measures of risk aversion are exogenous.
11 Hence, taking these results at face 
value, there is no need for an IV specification. 
As pointed out above, there is no a priori evidence that the normality assumption underlying the 
probit models is appropriate. Performing likelihood ratio tests comparing the log-likelihoods of 
the probit and the semi-nonparametric specification of the union membership equation 
described above indeed indicate that the normality assumption of the probit model might not be 
upheld. Therefore, in Table 2 we additionally present the estimated parameters for the different 
risk measures based on the semi-nonparametric specification.
12  
 
The estimated parameters of the two measures of individual risk preferences on monetary issues 
are significantly positive and similar in size to the estimated parameters of the standard probit 
specification, not documented in Table 1. Hence, relaxing the distribution assumptions of our 
econometric specifications again leads to parameter estimates which confirm the finding of a 
positive correlation between individual risk aversion and trade union membership.  
 
10 Height is a valid instrument in terms of significantly negative parameter estimates for the two risk measures 
Risk_finance and Risk_general in reduced-form specifications with the two risk measures as dependent variable, 
confirming findings by Dohmen et al. (2005). The respective test statistics are χ
2(1) = 5.47 and χ
2(1) = 3.96. There 
is no significant correlation between height and the measure of risk aversion based on the hypothetical lottery.  
11 The respective test statistics are χ
2(1) = 1.76 and χ
2(1) = 2.06. These results are confirmed by the test statistics of 
the Rivers/Vuong test of exogeneity. See Wooldridge (2002, pp. 472) for a description of both tests. Note, that the 
IV results (not documented) confirm our previous findings. 
12 The other parameter estimates are available from the authors on request.   
  Table 2: Union Membership and Individual Risk Attitudes in Germany 
             - Semi-Nonparametric Estimates (SNP) - 






ˆ α  0.035* 0.067*  -0.008 
(s.e.) 0.017  0.033 0.015 
LR_D 17.1**  15.5**  14.4** 
Wald_X 877.4**  953.0**  900.6** 
N 5369  5370  5372 
        Source:  SOEP 2003-2004. Longitudinal weights are used.  
  : Parameter estimate of particular risk measure.   ˆ α
  s.e.: standard error. Robust standard errors.  
  Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10). 
  Hermite polynomial is of order 3, i.e., three additional parameters are estimated.  
  Set of covariates is identical to specifications in Table 1.  
  LR_D: Likelihood-Ratio test of Probit-Model against SNP extended model. (df=1) 
  Wald_X: Wald-Test with H0: no joint significance of all regressors. (df=45) 
 
Furthermore, it might be surmised that wealth can affect the decision to join a union. In order to 
check this conjecture, we additionally use information on the individual stock of wealth 
collected in a special SOEP module in 2002 in a further regression analysis. We find that 
wealth has no significant impact on the decision to join the union, while our other results 
remain stable.  
Finally, respondents might interpret the scale of the risk questions differently. As mentioned 
above, we additionally employ a binary risk aversion indicator variable in our regression 
analysis to tackle this issue. Our main results are unaffected by including a binary instead of an 
eleven-point risk aversion indicator into the regressions.  
In conclusion, there is substantial evidence that the probability of trade union membership of 
German full-time workers rises with their aversion to risk, particularly in monetary matters. 
 
5. Further Correlation Analysis 
The theoretical model shows that the degree of risk aversion of the median trade union member 
has an impact on the bargained wage and, consequently, on employment. Our estimates indicate 
that an overall increase in the degree of risk aversion raises the individual probability of union 
membership and, ceteris paribus, union density, while the wage has no effect (Zw = 0; see 
Table A1 in the Appendix). As a consequence, the bargained wage will fall and employment 
increase if Vμ < 0 and ∂μ/∂ε > 0 hold, i.e., if, firstly, there is a negative relation between the 
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bargained wage and the measure of risk aversion of the median member and, secondly, a 
general increase in risk aversion also makes the (new) median member more risk averse (see 
Proposition 2).  
Due to the lack of matched employer–employee data with information on risk attitudes, we 
proceed in three steps to gain a crude grasp of the sign of Vμ∂μ/∂ε. First, we generate a set of 
cell dummies indicating combinations of union-specific industry dummies (eight unions), 
whether an individual lives in West or East Germany and has either of three occupational 
qualifications (low, medium, high). These 48 dummies mimic the bargaining structure in 
Germany. Second, we specify standard Mincer earnings regressions at the individual level 
including these 48 cell-specific dummies as well as the following covariates: age, age squared, 
tenure, tenure squared and dummy variables for being a foreigner, being male, different firm 
size categories, different occupation dummies (ISCO 1-digit), having completed an 
apprenticeship, having a university degree, being member of a works council and being a blue 
collar worker. In a third step, we use the estimated parameters of the cell-specific dummies and 
regress these adjusted average wage differentials on the cell-specific average risk preferences of 
union members as well as on union density. The observations are weighted by the size of the 
particular cell. Table 3 documents the parameter estimates of the third step.  
  Table 3: Gross Wages and Risk Attitudes of Union Members in Germany 
   
 
    ME / s.e.    ME / s.e.   ME / s.e. 
Risk Aversion_finance_cell -0.116*  --  -- 
 (0.051)  --  -- 
Risk Aversion_lottery_cell  --  -0.158+  -- 
 --  (0.089)  -- 
Risk Aversion_general_cell --  --  -0.055 
 --  --  (0.050) 
Union density_cell  0.006  0.006  0.006 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
N 43  43  43 
R
2 0.14  0.06  0.06 
    Source: SOEP 2003-2004. Cell-specific weights are applied.  
OLS-Regression of cell-specific adjusted average wage differentials on a cell-
specific average of individual risk aversion of union members and cell-
specific union density. We do not observe union members in 5 of our 48 cells.  
Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10).  
 
We observe significantly negative correlations between adjusted cell-specific (log) gross 
monthly wages and both averaged measures of the individual willingness to take risks in 
financial affairs for union members.
13 Our finding of a negative correlation is consistent with 
                                                 
13 Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde (2007) find a significantly negative correlation of individual wages and 
individual risk preferences for Germany.    18
the assumption of Vμ∂μ/∂ε < 0. Moreover, the parameter estimates reveal a positive correlation 
between industry-specific union densities and wages, but this correlation is not significantly 
different from zero.  
Our simple correlation exercise provides supportive evidence for the two effects of individual 
risk aversion in the theoretical model: higher risk aversion is correlated with lower wages while 
it also leads to a rise in union density, which tends to increase bargained wages. This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that a general increase in individual risk aversion changes the 
preferences of the median member, which unions take into account when bargaining over 
wages and which ceteris paribus has a negative impact on wages.  
 
6. Summary 
Why do workers belong to trade unions? Our theoretical analysis is based on the assumption 
that a union provides its members with an excludable good. We show theoretically that the net 
gain from membership varies with the extent of risk aversion. As a consequence, individual risk 
aversion alters the propensity to be a trade union member. Our empirical findings, based on the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), support this prediction. More specifically, we find 
that the probability of union membership increases significantly and by a sizeable amount with 
indicators of individual aversion to risk in monetary affairs. Hence, more risk-averse 
individuals are more likely to be a member of a trade union. In a collective bargaining set-up, a 
change in risk aversion will then have two effects. First, the median member's preferred wage 
(and employment) outcome changes. In addition, the variation in the level of union membership 
will alter the identity of the median member. Accordingly, variations in risk aversion have wage 
and employment effects. A simple correlation analysis with aggregated data from the GSOEP 
suggests that wages may fall and employment may rise with an increase in risk aversion of the 
labour force. This empirical finding is consistent with the predictions obtained in a monopoly 
union model in which trade unions provide insurance against income variations (Agell and 
Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995), as well as with the results of a general equilibrium model of 
search with risk aversion (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999).    19
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 Appendix  
Figure A1:  
 
0: non-member;         1: member of a trade union 
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    Table A1: Union Membership and Individual Risk Attitudes in Germany 
     -   Probit Estimates - 
 
  ME / s.e. 
Risk_finance 0.007* 
 (0.003) 
















University degree  -0.050 
 (0.028) 
Prefers SPD  0.106** 
 (0.022) 






Firm size: 20 ≤ X < 200 workers  0.099** 
 (0.028) 
Firm size: 200 ≤ X < 2000 workers  0.198** 
 (0.035) 
Firm size: X > 2000 workers  0.255** 
 (0.038) 
Member of works council  0.355** 
 (0.047) 
Industry dummies & state dummies        yes 
N 4881 
Wald_X   500.2** 
      Source:  SOEP 2003-2004. Longitudinal weights are used.   
        ME/s.e.: marginal effect/standard error.  
        Robust standard errors also allow for clustering  
        at the household level.  
        Wald_X: Wald-Test with H0: no joint significance  
    of  all  regressors.  (df=45) 
    Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10)   23
      Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Male  0.631  0.482    
Foreigner  0.078  0.267    
Age (in years)  41.089  10.75    
Tenure (in years)  10.512  9.666    
Apprenticeship  0.658  0.474    
University degree  0.212  0.409    
Prefers Social Democrats (SPD)  0.191  0.393    
Prefers Christian Parties (CDU/CSU)  0.185  0.388    
Blue collar worker  0.367  0.482    
Father was self-employed  0.101  0.302    
Firm size: 20 ≤ X < 200 workers  0.305  0.460    
Firm size: 200 ≤ X < 2000 workers  0.247  0.431    
Firm size: X ≥  2000 workers  0.235  0.424    
Member of works council  0.040  0.197    
Schleswig-Holstein  0.033  0.181    
Hamburg  0.025  0.156    
Lower Saxony  0.085  0.279    
Bremen  0.007  0.087    
North Rhine-Westphalia  0.219  0.414    
Hesse  0.065  0.247    
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland  0.054  0.226    
Baden-Wuerttemberg  0.134  0.341    
Bavaria  0.160  0.366    
Berlin (East)  0.015  0.122    
Mecklenburg / Western Pomerania  0.019  0.139    
Brandenburg  0.030  0.173    
Saxony-Anhalt  0.029  0.169    
Thuringia  0.034  0.182    
Saxony  0.055  0.229    
Agriculture/fishing   0.016  0.124    
Mining /quarrying  0.005  0.072    
Manufacturing   0.339  0.473    
Electricity / gas/ water supply   0.014  0.117    
Construction   0.082  0.274    
Wholesale and retail trade/ repair   0.112  0.316    
Hotels / restaurants   0.019  0.136    
Transport, storage / communication   0.061  0.239   
Financial intermediation   0.051  0.220    
Real estate / renting / business   0.076  0.265    
Public administration/ defence   0.059  0.235    
Education   0.039  0.192    
Health/social work  0.092  0.289    
Individual height (cm)  174.297  9.116 
       Source: SOEP 2003-2004. Longitudinal weights are used. N=5908.  
 